Frankfurt counter-example defused

"This is a pre-copy-editing, author produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Larvor, B. (2010) 'Frankfurt counter-example defused.' Analysis 70 (3) pp.506-508 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/" Copyright the authorFrankfurt’s 1969 paper ‘Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility’ purports to refute the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. It offers a case in which, Frankfurt claims, the agent is morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Wot U @ Uni 4? : expectations and actuality of studying philosophy at university

Original article can be found at: http://prs.heacademy.ac.uk/publications/In a project funded by the Subject Centre, we used focus groups to explore students' answers to six questions, including their reasons for going to university and their views of the purpose of higher education. Particular surprises were the invisibility of research to students and the depth of disagreement about the value of seminars. But most significant was the consequence of the dramatic decline in contact hours on arrival at university. Students found it difficult to form supportive study relationships. They also seem unclear about the distinc tion between collaboration and collusion. We end, therefore, by suggesting that learning and teaching practice needs to be illuminated by reflections on critical friendship.Peer reviewe

From Euclidean Geometry to Knots and Nets

This document is the Accepted Manuscript of an article accepted for publication in Synthese. Under embargo until 19 September 2018. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1558-x.This paper assumes the success of arguments against the view that informal mathematical proofs secure rational conviction in virtue of their relations with corresponding formal derivations. This assumption entails a need for an alternative account of the logic of informal mathematical proofs. Following examination of case studies by Manders, De Toffoli and Giardino, Leitgeb, Feferman and others, this paper proposes a framework for analysing those informal proofs that appeal to the perception or modification of diagrams or to the inspection or imaginative manipulation of mental models of mathematical phenomena. Proofs relying on diagrams can be rigorous if (a) it is easy to draw a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates the structure of the mathematical object, (b) the information thus displayed is not metrical and (c) it is possible to put the inferences into systematic mathematical relation with other mathematical inferential practices. Proofs that appeal to mental models can be rigorous if the mental models can be externalised as diagrammatic practice that satisfies these three conditions.Peer reviewe

Why 'scaffolding' is the wrong metaphor : the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations.

The metaphor of scaffolding has become current in discussions of the cognitive help we get from artefacts, environmental affordances and each other. Consideration of mathematical tools and representations indicates that in these cases at least (and plausibly for others), scaffolding is the wrong picture, because scaffolding in good order is immobile, temporary and crude. Mathematical representations can be manipulated, are not temporary structures to aid development, and are refined. Reflection on examples from elementary algebra indicates that Menary is on the right track with his ‘enculturation’ view of mathematical cognition. Moreover, these examples allow us to elaborate his remarks on the uniqueness of mathematical representations and their role in the emergence of new thoughts.Peer reviewe

The Concept of Culture in Critical Mathematics Education

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of a chapter published in The Philosophy of Mathematics Education Today. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77760-3A well-known critique in the research literature of critical mathematics education suggests that framing educational questions in cultural terms can encourage ethnic-cultural essentialism, obscure conflicts within cultures and promote an ethnographic or anthropological stance towards learners. Nevertheless, we believe that some of the obstacles to learning mathematics are cultural. ‘Stereotype threat’, for example, has a basis in culture. Consequently, the aims of critical mathematics education cannot be seriously pursued without including a cultural approach in educational research. We argue that an adequate conception of culture is available and should include normative/descriptive and material/ideal dyads as dialectical moments

An Inquiry into the Practice of Proving in Low-Dimensional Topology

The aim of this article is to investigate specific aspects connected with visualization in the practice of a mathematical subfield: low-dimensional topology. Through a case study, it will be established that visualization can play an epistemic role. The background assumption is that the consideration of the actual practice of mathematics is relevant to address epistemological issues. It will be shown that in low-dimensional topology, justifications can be based on sequences of pictures. Three theses will be defended. First, the representations used in the practice are an integral part of the mathematical reasoning. As a matter of fact, they convey in a material form the relevant transitions and thus allow experts to draw inferential connections. Second, in low-dimensional topology experts exploit a particular type of manipulative imagination which is connected to intuition of two- and three-dimensional space and motor agency. This imagination allows recognizing the transformations which connect different pictures in an argument. Third, the epistemic—and inferential—actions performed are permissible only within a specific practice: this form of reasoning is subject-matter dependent. Local criteria of validity are established to assure the soundness of representationally heterogeneous arguments in low-dimensional topology

Mathematical practice, crowdsourcing, and social machines

The highest level of mathematics has traditionally been seen as a solitary endeavour, to produce a proof for review and acceptance by research peers. Mathematics is now at a remarkable inflexion point, with new technology radically extending the power and limits of individuals. Crowdsourcing pulls together diverse experts to solve problems; symbolic computation tackles huge routine calculations; and computers check proofs too long and complicated for humans to comprehend. Mathematical practice is an emerging interdisciplinary field which draws on philosophy and social science to understand how mathematics is produced. Online mathematical activity provides a novel and rich source of data for empirical investigation of mathematical practice - for example the community question answering system {\it mathoverflow} contains around 40,000 mathematical conversations, and {\it polymath} collaborations provide transcripts of the process of discovering proofs. Our preliminary investigations have demonstrated the importance of "soft" aspects such as analogy and creativity, alongside deduction and proof, in the production of mathematics, and have given us new ways to think about the roles of people and machines in creating new mathematical knowledge. We discuss further investigation of these resources and what it might reveal. Crowdsourced mathematical activity is an example of a "social machine", a new paradigm, identified by Berners-Lee, for viewing a combination of people and computers as a single problem-solving entity, and the subject of major international research endeavours. We outline a future research agenda for mathematics social machines, a combination of people, computers, and mathematical archives to create and apply mathematics, with the potential to change the way people do mathematics, and to transform the reach, pace, and impact of mathematics research.Comment: To appear, Springer LNCS, Proceedings of Conferences on Intelligent Computer Mathematics, CICM 2013, July 2013 Bath, U

How to think about informal proofs

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Brendan Larvor, ‘How to think about informal proofs’, Synthese, Vol. 187(2): 715-730, first published online 9 September 2011. The final publication is available at Springer via doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0007-5It is argued in this study that (i) progress in the philosophy of mathematical practice requires a general positive account of informal proof; (ii) the best candidate is to think of informal proofs as arguments that depend on their matter as well as their logical form; (iii) articulating the dependency of informal inferences on their content requires a redefinition of logic as the general study of inferential actions; (iv) it is a decisive advantage of this conception of logic that it accommodates the many mathematical proofs that include actions on objects other than propositions; (v) this conception of logic permits the articulation of project-sized tasks for the philosophy of mathematical practice, thereby supplying a partial characterisation of normal research in the fieldPeer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio